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DOUBLE INDEMNITY FOR OPERATORS OF NUCLEAR
FACILITIES? IN RE HANFORD NUCLEAR RESERVATION
LITIGATION, THE PRICE-ANDERSON ACT, AND THE
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE
Chris Addicott
Abstract: Thousands of people who lived downwind of the Hanford Nuclear Reservation
have brought suit against the contractors who operated the facility, claiming that radiation
releases caused property damage, illness, and death. For the defendants, there is little at
stake. Because they fall under the Price-Anderson Act, the U.S. Government will indemnify
them for their legal expenses and any judgments against them. Nevertheless, the defendants
have invoked the "government contractor defense," claiming that they should be immune
from suit because anything they may have done wrong was done at the direction of the
government. This Comment argues that the government contractor defense, which is a
creation of federal common law, should not be available to Price-Anderson contractors.
Operators of nuclear facilities are already protected by the indemnity provisions of Price-
Anderson. Price-Anderson carefully balances the need to ensure that victims of nuclear
accidents receive swift and adequate compensation with the goal of facilitating the
participation of the private sector in the nuclear industry. To preserve this balance and avoid
denying recovery to plaintiffs with legitimate claims, Price-Anderson must preempt the
government contractor defense.
I drive through Hanford now and I get very angry just seeing that
this beautiful place where I grew up has poisoned me, as well as
my friends and theirfamilies .... I feel an incredible amount of
outrage about what Hanford has done to that area, to my friends
and family. And it goes beyond just my having cancer... I have to
live with what else is going to happen to me and to those people.'
In the once pristine deserts and hills of Eastern Washington flanking
the Columbia river lies one of the most toxic sites on earth. The
radioactive remnants of the facilities that produced the plutonium that
ended World War II stew in massive underground tanks, some of which
are slowly leaking, some of which threaten to explode.2 These tanks-
with their deadly mixture of radionuclides and other toxic chemicals 3-
1. Deposition Upon Oral Examination of Kathryn Lee Hamilton at 43-44, In re Hanford Nuclear
Reservation Litigation [hereinafter Hanford] (E.D. Wash. Oct. 4, 1991) (Master File No. CY-91-
3015-AAM). Ms. Hamilton died of cancer approximately one year after her deposition was taken.
Interview with Ms. Hamilton's mother, Mary Lee Thorpe, in Grandview, Wash. (Jan. 26, 1997).
2. Michael D'Antonio, Atomic Harvest: Hanford and the Lethal Toll of America's Nuclear
Arsenal xii (1993).
3. Hanford plaintiffs allege that a number of these substances, including chromium, tritium,
iodine-129, cyanide, uranium, nitrates, carbon tetrachloride, and technetium-99, have leaked into
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are an apt metaphor for the multitude of overlapping and sometimes
conflicting legal doctrines that ultimately will determine when and how
this mess is cleaned up, and whether and to whom blame and financial
responsibility will be assigned for the thousands of injuries and deaths
the activities at Hanford may have caused over the last fifty years.
The case of In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litigation
("Hanford")4 was first filed on August 6, 1990. Although some
preliminary matters have been decided,' a trial date has not yet been set.6
The Hanford plaintiffs lived near, worked at, or had an interest in real
property or commercial enterprises near the Hanford Nuclear
Reservation.7 The defendants-DuPont, GE, UNC Nuclear Industries,
ARCO, and Rockwell International-are major corporations who
contracted in succession with the Department of Energy (DOE) to
operate the Hanford facility, which produced plutonium for the
government.' The plaintiffs allege that the defendants negligently,
recklessly, and intentionally released a variety of radionuclides and other
toxic substances into the environment surrounding Hanford.9 As a result,
the plaintiffs claim, they suffered property damage, illness, and death.'0
the groundwater at Hanford. Plaintiffs' Joint Consolidated Complaint and Jury Demand at 37-38,
Hanford (Master File No. CY-91-3015-AAM) [hereinafter Consolidated Complaint].
4. See Class Action Complaint and Complaint for Individual Damages and Jury Demand,
Hanford (E.D. Wash. 1990) (Master File No. CY-90-3067-AAM).
5. See, e.g., In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 780 F. Supp. 1551 (E.D. Wash. 1991).
6. Interview with Tom Foulds, Co-Lead Counsel for the Plaintiffs, in Seattle, Wash. (Jan. 31,
1997).
7. Consolidated Complaint, supra note 3, at 4-5.
8. Il at 13-14. Westinghouse Hanford Co. was named as a defendant in the Consolidated
Complaint, id at 14, but has since been dropped from the suit because apparently it was not
responsible for any off-site releases of radiation. Interview with Tom Foulds, Co-Lead Counsel for
the Plaintiffs, in Seattle, Wash. (Oct. 25, 1996).
9. Consolidated Complaint, supra note 3, at 14-42. Plaintiffs allege that there were radiation
releases through the water, the air, and from leaking storage tanks during plutonium production.
Although the plutonium production process was obviously complex, there were essentially two
steps. First, uranium underwent nuclear fission and was converted into p'utonium and other
radionuclides. Second, the plutonium was chemically separated from the resulfng material. During
fission, radiation allegedly was released into the Columbia River. Water from the Columbia was
piped in to cool the fuel rods, impurities in the water became radioactive, on occasion fuel rods
ruptured, and these radioactive substances were released when the water was returned directly to
the river. Airborne emissions allegedly occurred during the chemical extraction process, when the
radioactive byproducts were released directly into the atmosphere through exhaust stacks. Finally,
various radioactive and other toxic substances allegedly have leaked into the groundwater from the
underground tanks used to store the high-level radioactive waste at Hanford. Id. at 21-42.
10. Id. at 6. Plaintiffs' claimed injuries include "personal injury, emotional distress, diminution
in the value of real property, lost income, and/or a significant increased risk of harm." Id. at 5.
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The plaintiffs' complaint sets forth a broad range of legal theories of
recovery. Under the Price-Anderson Act (Price-Anderson)" the
plaintiffs have claimed eight causes of action in state tort law:'
2
negligence and negligence per se; absolute or strict liability; intentional
trespass and private nuisance; public nuisance; misrepresentation and
concealment;" outrageous conduct and intentional infliction of
emotional distress; negligent infliction of emotional distress; and civil
conspiracy."4 Because of the inherent difficulties of proving causation in
large toxic tort cases,"5 particularly for radiological injuries, 6 it will be
difficult for the plaintiffs to prevail on any of these theories. If the
plaintiffs do prevail, any judgments will be paid not by the defendants,
but by the U.S. Government.
17
All of the Hanford defendants have indemnity agreements with the
U.S. Government that fall under Price-Anderson. 8 In the event that a
state tort action is successfully maintained against a Price-Anderson
contractor, these indemnity agreements cap the amount of damages that
may be awarded and indemnify the contractors for any judgments they
pay and any legal expenses they incur.'9 Despite this financial
protection, the case is being defended vigorously. Each defendant has
plead in excess of twenty affirmative defenses20 and claimed immunity
Personal injuries include thyroid cancer, stomach cancer, intestinal cancer, breast cancer, leukemia,
hypothyroidism, miscarriages, and birth defects. Id. at 4-12.
11. Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1994));
see infra Parts L.A and .B.
12. Consolidated Complaint, supra note 3, at 60-76.
13. Under this theory, plaintiffs allege that the defendants conspired to conceal the dangerous
nature of the activities conducted at Hanford. Id. at 70.
14. Id. at 60-76. The plaintiffs also claim that the defendants are liable for environmental
response costs under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1994). Consolidated Complaint, supra note 3, at 76-77.
15. See Jack B. Weinstein, Individual Justice in Mass Tort Litigation 151-52 (1995).
16. See Craig A. Barr, A Practical Guide to Proving and Disproving Causation in Radiation
Exposure Cases: HanfordNuclear Site and Radioactive Iodine, 31 Gonz. L. Rev. 1 (1996); Dan M.
Berkovitz, Price-Anderson Act: Model Compensation Legislation?-The Sixty-Three Million
Dollar Question, 13 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 1, 42-48 (1989).
17. See infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
18. See infra Part I.C.
19. See infra Part I.C.
20. These include arguments that the plaintiffs assumed the risk; that the claims are not valid or
ripe; that the claims are barred or reduced by statutes of limitations, statutes of repose, laches, and
contributory negligence; that there were intervening causes; that the state claims are preempted by
federal laws; and that the alleged injuries were caused by someone else. See Answers of E.I. Du
Pont De Nemours & Co. at 30-35; UNC Nuclear Indus., Inc. at 2-31; Rockwell Int'l Corp. at 23-
507
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from suit on a variety of doctrinal grounds.21 Under one of these
immunity defenses, a creation of federal common law that has become
known as the "government contractor defense,"'22 the defendants claim,
in essence, "[t]he Government made [them] do it."23
This Comment argues that the government contractor defense should
not be available to Price-Anderson contractors. Part I lays out the basic
provisions of Price-Anderson and describes the indemnity agreements
that exist between the government and the Hanford contractors. Part II
describes the evolution, purposes, and elements of the government
contractor defense. Part III suggests that the underlying rationale of the
defense is inapplicable to Price-Anderson contractors. Finally, Part IV
argues that Price-Anderson preempts the government contractor defense.
I. TIE PRICE-ANDERSON ACT
In the 1950s the U.S. Government decided to encourage private
industry to participate in the nuclear power industry. Recognizing that
the private sector was leery of the potentially enormous liabilities that
went hand-in-hand with the destructive power of nuclear energy,
Congress responded with the Price-Anderson Act.24 Price-Anderson
28; General Elec. Co. at 1, 24-29; Atlantic Richfield Hanford Co. at 58-64 [hereinafter
Defendants' Answers], Hanford (E.D. Wash. 1992) (Master File No. CY-91-3015-AAM).
Interestingly, in at least one toxic tort case similar to Hanford, the court helci that the defendant's
assertion that the plaintiffs had assumed the risk by choosing to live near a chemical plant was "so
outrageous as to subject the defendant to punitive damages." Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 647
F. Supp. 303, 323 (W.D. Tenn. 1986), modified, 855 F.2d 1188, 1216 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that
such punitive damages could only be assessed if defense had been asserted in bad faith). Although
punitive damages may not be assessed against Price-Anderson contractors if they are to be
indemnified by the government, 42 U.S.C. § 2210(s) (1994), the court nevertheless is likely to
frown on the assertion of outrageous, unfounded defenses.
21. Defendants' Answers, supra note 20. Specifically, the defendants argue: (1) that the claims
against them are really claims against the United States and are thus barred by sovereign immunity;
(2) that the claims fall within the "discretionary function" exception to the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1994); (3) that the defendants' actions were undertaken pursuant to
governmental privilege and public necessity; and (4) that the defendants were government
contractors and they acted only at the direction and under the supervision and control of the
government. Id. This Comment focuses only on the last of these arguments.
22. Some courts refer to the defense as the "military contractor defense." This Comment adopts
the term "government contractor defense" to avoid confusion.
23. In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 960 F.2d 806, 813 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing In re New York
Asbestos Litig., 897 F.2d 626, 632 (2d Cir. 1990)).
24. Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1994)).
For contemporaneous analyses of Price-Anderson, see Recent Statutes, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 750
(1958); Comment, Atomic Energy-Indemnity Legislation-Anderson Amendments to the Atomic
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offers private companies a deal: if they participate, the government will
indemnify them for any judgments against them. The Hanford
defendants are all insured by such indemnity agreements.
A. Purposes of Price-Anderson
Congress passed the Price-Anderson Act in 1957 as a comprehensive
amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.25 Price-Anderson had
two fundamental purposes: "to protect the public and to encourage the
development of the atomic energy industry." 6 After holding a number of
hearings in 1956, Congress's Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
concluded that the open-ended liability associated with operating nuclear
facilities was deterring the participation of private parties in the
industry.27 Although the possibility of a nuclear accident was considered
remote, the estimated costs of an accident ranged from a few hundred
thousand to over one billion dollars.2" Many companies were unwilling
to take on this highly uncertain liability.29 It was also impossible to
adequately insure against this risk.3" Because of lack of actuarial
experience in the area and the small number of potential industry
participants among whom risk could be spread, the largest liability
policy that could be obtained at the time was for twenty-five million
dollars.3"
B. General Provisions of Price-Anderson
To accomplish Price-Anderson's purpose of ensuring that victims are
adequately compensated in the event of a nuclear accident, the statute
Energy Act of 1954, 56 Mich. L. Rev. 752 (1958). For a comprehensive review of Price-Anderson,
see Berkovitz, supra note 16, at 5-41.
25. Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919 (1954) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296
(1994)).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2012(i) (1994); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc.,
438 U.S. 59,64 (1978).
27. S. Rep. No. 85-296 (1957), reprinted in 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1803.
28. Id. at 1804.
29. Id. ("Since radioactive materials are many times more toxic and poisonous than other
substances, the companies ... are hesitant about assuming the liabilities which could ensue in the
remote event of a reactor meltdown with the resulting release of fission preducts and radioactive
materials into the air.").
30. Laurie R. Rockett, Legislative Drafting Research Fund, Columbia Univ., Issues of Financial
Protection in Nuclear Activities § 2-2 (1973).
31. I
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simply relies on state tort law. 2 At no point in the consideration of
Price-Anderson did Congress seriously contemplate creating a federal
cause of action to allow recovery.3 The U.S. Supreme Court has stated
that in passing Price-Anderson, "Congress assumed -that traditional
principles of state tort law would apply with fall force unless they were
expressly supplanted."'34
Price-Anderson encourages private participation in the nuclear
industry by limiting the total amount of money that plaintiffs may
recover for each nuclear incident,35 providing insurance mechanisms for
contractors,36 and indemnifying contractors for liability in some
instances. 7 Price-Anderson draws a distinction, however, between
contractors who operate commercial power plants for the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission ("NRC contractors") and those: involved with
weapons production for the DOE ("DOE contractors")." Both types of
contractors enjoy the same limit on liability, but only DOE contractors
are indemnified by the government.39
Price-Anderson's liability cap for all contractors is set equal to the
total level of financial protection required of NRC contractors.40 Each
NRC contractor must carry $200 million of primary liability insurance.4
In addition, in the event of a nuclear incident for which liability is
incurred, each NRC contractor must pay "retrospective" premiums of up
to $75.5 million.42 With 109 NRC contractors currently operating
32. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 255-56 (1984).
33. Berkovitz, supra note 16; see also Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 255-56.
34. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 255.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e) (1994).
36. See infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
38. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2210(b)-(c) (1994) (governing NRC licensees) with 42 U.S.C.
§ 2210(d) (1994) (governing DOE contractors). NRC contractors are engaged in commercial
activities such as fabricating nuclear fuel and operating nuclear power plants, whereas DOE
contractors generally are involved in the development, testing, or production of nuclear weapons.
Berkovitz, supra note 16, at 1.
39. There remains in the law a vestigial requirement that the government indemnify NRC
contractors for the difference between $560 million and the amount of available liability insurance.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(c). However, because NRC contractors are insured well in excess of $560
million, this provision no longer has any effect, and the government will not have to indemnify
NRC contractors in the event of a nuclear accident. Berkovitz, supra note 16, at 15.
40. 42 U.S.C § 2210(e).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(bXl); 10 C.F.R. § 140.1 1(a)(4) (1996).
42. 10 C.F.R. § 140.11 (aX4). No more than $10 million of this amount raay be assessed each
year. § 140.l(aX4).
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nuclear power plants,43 this secondary insurance mechanism may
provide up to $8.2 billion of protection.' Combined with the primary
insurance, the total liability for each nuclear incident is capped at
approximately $8.4 billion, although this limit will of course fluctuate
over time as a function of the number of NRC contractors and the
amount of primary insurance required.45
The liability cap for NRC contractors also applies to DOE
contractors.' However, DOE contractors, which include the Hanford
defendants, do not have to pay "retrospective" premiums if they incur
liability.47 Instead, the government indemnifies DOE contractors for any
uninsured liability up to the amount of the liability cap.4 The
government also may indemnify the contractors for any legal expenses
they incur.49 Finally, because the government ultimately must pay the
bulk of any claims against DOE contractors, it has the authority to direct
the defense of the case and must review and approve any settlements. 0
C. The Indemnity Agreements of the Hanford Defendants
All of the Hanford defendants have indemnity agreements with the
government that fall under Price-Anderson.5 The indemnity agreement
43. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, Nuclear Plant Information Books (last modified Mar. 26,
1996) <http://www.nre.gov/AEOD/pib/disclaimer.html>.
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(bXl).
45. § 2210(bXl); 10 C.F.R. § 140.1 1(aX4).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(d) (1994).
47. § 2210(d). At its discretion, however, DOE may require its contractors to carry basic
insurance. § 2210(dX2).
48. § 2210(d).
49. § 2210(dX2).
50. § 2210(dX2).
51. Some of the Hanford contractors operated the facilities under agreement with the Atomic
Energy Commission, the DOE predecessor agency, prior to the passage of Price-Anderson. DuPont
operated Hanford beginning on October 4, 1942. Contract No. W-7412-eng-1 between the United
States and DuPont [hereinafter DuPont Contract] (Nov. 6, 1943) (on file with Washington Law
Review). General Electric took over operations of Hanford on May 15, 1946. Contract No. AT(45-
1)- 1350 between the United States and General Electric [hereinafter General Electric Contract]
(July 14, 1959) (on file with Washington Law Review). Nevertheless, all the Hanford defendants
currently fall under Price-Anderson:
All agreements of indemnification under which the Department of Energy (or its predecessor
agencies) may be required to indemnify any person, shall be deemed to be amended, on
August 20, 1988, to reflect the amount of indemnity for public liability and any applicable
financial protection required of the contractor under this subsection on August 20, 1988.
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between DuPont and the United States was entered into prior to the
enactment of Price-Anderson, but nevertheless provides comprehensive
protection for the company in the event that it is sued for actions
undertaken under the contract.12 The indemnity agreements of the
remaining defendants, which were drafted under Price-Anderson, are
more comprehensive than the DuPont agreement in that for catastrophic
nuclear accidents, indemnification is provided even if the accident was
willfully or maliciously caused by the contractor. 3 The contracts are less
comprehensive in that the contractors are required to carry liability
insurance for accidents, and for extraordinary nuclear incidents the
contractor must waive certain defenses, including government
immunity.
54
II. THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE
The government contractor defense immunizes government
contractors from lawsuits in state tort law when a contractor can
establish that "[t]he Government made [them] do it.""5 It is an
affirmative defense and the contractor bears the burden of proving each
of its elements by a preponderance of the evidence. 6 Prior to 1988, the
circuits were split as to both the doctrinal basis of the defense and its
42 U.S.C. § 2210(dX3XC). In addition, the Hanford parties have not contested the applicability of
Price-Anderson. See In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 780 F. Supp. 1551 (E.D. Wash.
1991).
52. See DuPont Contract, supra note 51. The contract provides:
The Contractor shall not be liable for, and the Government shall indernnify and hold the
Contractor harmless against, any delay, failure, loss, expense (including expense of litigation)
or damage (including personal injuries and deaths of persons and damage to property) of any
kind and for any cause whatsoever [except] ... bad faith or willful [sic] misconduct.
Id. at 49.
53. General Electric Contract, supra note 51, at 66-84; Contract No. AT(45-I)-2130 between
the United States and Atlantic Richfield Hanford Co. 37-39 [hereinafter ARCO Contract] (Aug. 1,
1967) (on file with Washington Law Review); Contract No. DE-AC06-77RL01030 between the
United States and Rockwell International Corp. 42-46 [hereinafter Rockwell Contract] (Oct. 1,
1982) (on file with Washington Law Review); Contract No. DE-AC06-76RL01857 between the
United States and UNC Nuclear Industries, Inc. 43-48 [hereinafter UNC Contract] (Jan. 1, 1984)
(on file with Washington Law Review).
54. General Electric Contract, supra note 51, at 66-84; ARCO Contract, supra note 53, at 37-
39; Rockwell Contract, supra note 53, at 42-46; UNC Contract, supra note 53, at 43-48.
55. In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 960 F.2d 806, 813 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing In re New York
Asbestos Litig., 897 F.2d 626, 632 (2d Cir. 1990)).
56. Oliver v. Oshkosh Truck Corp., 96 F.3d 992 (7th Cir. 1996); Carley v. Wheeled Coach, 991
F.2d 1117, 1125 (3d Cir. 1993).
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formulation.57 These disputes were resolved, however, with the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Boyle v. United States Technologies Corp.58
Since Boyle, courts generally have agreed on how the elements of the
government contractor defense should be applied, but the circuits have
split on the issues of when the defense may be invoked and what types
of contractors may invoke it.
A. Historical Development
The first U.S. Supreme Court case to immunize a government
contractor from suit was Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction Co.59 The
Yearsley Court held that a contractor conducting a public works project
for the government could not be sued because it was an agent of the
government, and thus cloaked in the United States' sovereign
immunity.6 The "agency" rationale was seriously undermined, however,
with the passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),61 which
specifically excludes independent contractors from the definition of
federal agency.62 Since the passage of the FTCA but prior to the U.S.
Supreme Court's landmark decision in Boyle, the government contractor
defense survived, but primarily in the context of military contracts. 63
Courts developed two different theories for defining the scope of
"military contractor immunity." First, in McKay v. Rockwell
International Corp.,64 the Ninth Circuit held that the government
contractor defense would apply in cases in which suit is brought by
57. See infra Part II.A.
58. 487 U.S. 500 (1988); see infra Part II.B.
59. 309 U.S. 18(1940).
60. Id at 20-21. In Yearsley, the defendant had contracted with the government to build a series
of dikes along the Missouri River. The plaintiff owned property along the river and sued on the
grounds that the defendant's actions had caused 95 acres of his property to be eroded away. Id. at
19-20.
61. 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346(b), 1346(c), 1402(b),
1504, 2110, 2401(b), 2402, 2411 (b), 2412(c), 2671-2680 (1994)). The FTCA waives the United
States' sovereign immunity for harm caused by the negligent or wrongful conduct of government
officials, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), but exempts from this waiver "[a]ny claim ... based upon the
exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the
part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved
be abused." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a); see also Grover Glenn Hankins, The Federal Tort Claims Act: A
Smooth Stone for the Sling, 31 Gonz. L. Rev. 27, 41-47 (1996).
62. 28 U.S.C. § 2671.
63. R. Joel Ankney, Note, "But I Was Only Following Orders": The Government Contractor
Defense in Environmental Tort Litigation, 32 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 399, 403-05 (199 1).
64. 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1982).
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members of the military against a contractor, and in which the United
States would have been immune from suit under the Feres-Stencel
doctrine.65 The Fourth Circuit adopted the same approach in Tozer v.
LTV Corp.,66 reasoning that if contractors were not immunized from suit
under these circumstances, they would pass the costs of liability on to
the government, which would defeat the purpose of immunizing the
government in the first place. The second approach was enunciated in
Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp.,67 where the Eleventh Circuit
recognized a "military contractor defense" founded on the principle that
"the constitutional separation of powers compels the judiciary to defer to
a military decision." '68 The Boyle Court has since rejected both of these
approaches.69
The pre-Boyle decisions also disagreed on how to define the elements
of the government contractor defense. The Eleventh Circuit held that a
contractor could take advantage of the defense only by showing that it
had minimal input into the design of the defective equipment, and that it
warned the government about any known risks.7" The Fourth and Ninth
Circuits, however, held that the defense would apply when the
government approved reasonably precise specifications, the contractor
conformed to the specifications, and the contractor warned the
government about any known dangers.71 The Boyle Court adopted these
elements, but changed the doctrinal basis of the defense."z
65. l at 451. The Feres-Stencel doctrine refers to two U.S. Supreme Court cases that together
immunize the government from suits brought by members of the military. In Feres v. United States,
340 U.S. 135 (1950), the Court held that members of the military cannot bring suit against the
government for injuries arising incident to service. Id. at 146. In Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v.
United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977), the Court extended this rule to hold that contractors who had
been sued by members of the military for injuries arising incident to service could not seek
indemnity from the government. Id. at 673-74.
66. 792 F.2d 403, 408 (4th Cir. 1986), cited in Boyle v. United States Techs. Corp., 487 U.S.
500,510 (1988).
67. 778 F.2d 736 (1 Ith Cir. 1985).
68. Id. at 743
69. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 510. The Boyle court never discussed the separation of powers rationale,
but explicitly rejected Feres-Stencel as a doctrinal basis for the government contractor defense. Id.
The Court found that the doctrine was too narrow because it only immunized contractors when they
were sued by members of the military, and too broad because it would apply even when the
government had exercised no discretion in selecting the design feature that was at issue. Id
70. Shaw, 778 F.2d at 746.
71. Tozer, 792 F.2d at 408; McKay, 704 F.2d at 451.
72. See infra Part II.B.
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B. Boyle: The Modern Formulation of the Government Contractor
Defense
David Boyle drowned in 1983 when he was unable to escape his
helicopter after it crashed into the ocean off the coast of Virginia. He
had been a helicopter copilot for the U.S. Marines. 3 Boyle's father
brought suit against the manufacturer of the helicopter, Sikorsky,
alleging among other things that Sikorsky had defectively designed the
helicopter's escape hatch to open outwards, instead of inwards.7' As a
result, due to water pressure, Boyle was unable to escape.7' The jury
found for Boyle and awarded $725,000.76 The court of appeals reversed,
finding that Sikorsky could not be held liable because of the "military
contractor defense."' The U.S. Supreme Court agreed that the defense
could be raised on these facts. Nevertheless, the Court remanded the
case to determine whether the court of appeals had decided as a factual
matter that the defense applied, which would be error, or whether it had
decided as a matter of law that no reasonable jury could have found for
Boyle, which would be allowed.78
1. Preliminary Requirements
The government contractor defense established under Boyle is
grounded in the federal common law.79 The Court noted that there are
certain areas of "uniquely federal interests"" where "state law is pre-
empted and replaced, where necessary, by federal law of a content
prescribed (absent explicit statutory directive) by the courts-so-called
'federal common law."'''. Boyle bordered on two areas that the Court had
73. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 502.
74. Id.
75. Id
76. Id at 503.
77. Id.
78. Id at 514.
79. Regardless of the various intellectual foundations and formulations of the elements of the
government contractor immunity defense, it has always been a rule of federal common law.
Compare Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co. 309 U.S. 18, 22 (1940) with McKay v. Rockwell Int'l
Corp., 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983).
80. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 504 (citing Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials Inc., 451 U.S. 630,
640 (1981)).
81. Id. at 504 (citing United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726-29 (1979); Banco
Nacional v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426-27 (1964); Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593, 597 (1959);
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943); D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v.
FDIC, 315 U.S. 447,457-58 (1942)).
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previously found to be of uniquely federal interest--the contractual
rights and obligations of the United States and the civil liability of
federal officials acting within the scope of their duty. 2 The Court thus
held that "the procurement of equipment by the United States" is an area
of uniquely federal interest,83 and that this interest exists as much in
performance contracts as in procurement contracts.
84
For the government contractor defense to apply, however, Boyle also
requires that the federal interest be "implicated" by the contract. 5 In
other words, the contract must threaten to impede the ability of
government contracting officials to do their jobs. This was the case in
Boyle, the Court reasoned, because if government contractors were
subjected to liability, then either they would decline to enter into such
contracts in the future, or they would charge more for their services.
Either way, the discretion of government officials to purchase items with
specified design features would be limited.86
Finally, the Court held that the government contractor defense only is
available when "a 'significant conflict' exists between an identifiable
'federal policy or interest and the [operation] of state law,'[r 7 ] . . . or the
application of state law would 'frustrate specific objectives."', 88 The
Court provided no bright-line rule for when such a significant conflict
will exist, but held that the discretionary function exception to the
Federal Tort Claims Act8 9 should guide the analysis." A contractual
provision can only significantly conflict with state tort law when it
embodies the discretionary decision of a government official. If a federal
procurement officer for the military orders "stock aelicopters that
happen to be equipped with escape hatches opening outward, it is
impossible to say that the Government has a significant interest in that
particular feature."91 Whenever it is impossible to comply with both
82. Id. at 504-05.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 507. Note that this is the same reasoning employed by the Fourth Circuit in Tozer v.
LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1986). See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
87. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507 (citing Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966)).
88. Id. at 507 (citing United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979)).
89. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1994); see supra note 61.
90. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511 (stating that FTCA "suggests the outlines of... 'significant conflict'
between federal interests and state law in the context of Government procurement").
91. Id. at 509.
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federal and state interests, however, a "significant conflict" exists.92 In
Boyle, there was a "significant conflict" because the contract required
that the escape door open outwards, whereas the duty of care under state
tort law required that the door open inwards.93
2. The Three-Part Test
Once the basic requirements are established, Boyle prescribes a three-
part test to determine when the federal contract provisions will displace
state tort law:
Liability for design defects in military equipment cannot be
imposed, pursuant to state law, when (1) the United States
approved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the equipment
conformed to those specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the
United States about the dangers in the use of the equipment that
were known to the supplier but not to the United States.94
The purpose of the three-part test is to protect the discretionary
decisions of the federal government.95 The first two prongs of the test
ensure that the contract was carried out pursuant to a discretionary
decision of a government official.96 If the government did not review
and approve precise specifications, the contract would not embody an
exercise of discretion; if the contract did not conform to those
specifications, in effect there would be no government approval at all.
The third requirement is designed to accomplish the same objective, but
indirectly.0' The Boyle Court reasoned that if government contractors
were not required to disclose knowledge of dangers, they would have a
perverse incentive to withhold information so as not to jeopardize the
contract.98 This, in turn, would lead to government officials being forced
to make discretionary decisions without vital information."
92. Ia
93. Id.
94. Id. at 512.
95. Id. at 512-13.
96. Id at 512.
97. Id
98. Id
99. Id at 512-513.
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C. Applying the Government Contractor Defense After Boyle
In the wake of Boyle, there has been considerable litigation over each
of the elements of the three-part test, but courts have reached a rough
consensus regarding when these elements are satisfied. The circuits have
split, however, on whether the defense applies narrowly to contracts for
military equipment or broadly to any government contract, and
concomitantly, on whether the existence of a "significant conflict"
should be considered a separate threshold requirement or should be
presumed to be met whenever the three-part test is satisfied.
1. Interpreting the Three-Part Test
To establish that the government approved reasonably precise
specifications, the first prong of the three-part test, a contractor must
show that the government conducted a meaningful, substantive review
of the specifications at issue; the test is not satisfied when the contract
was approved with a mere rubber stamp.'" Applying this standard,
government approval is found when the government and the contractor
engaged in a "continuous back and forth" review process regarding the
design feature in question.'' The precision requirement is intended to
ensure that the government approved the precise specification that gave
rise to the lawsuit. 2
100. See Tate v. Boeing Helicopters, 55 F. 3d 1150, 1154 (6th Cir. 1995) (referring to purpose of
this prong of test, stating that "[t]he government exercises no discretion when it simply approves a
design with a rubber stamp, that is, approves a design without scrutiny"); Levis v. Babcock Indus.,
Inc., 985 F.2d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 1993); Maguire v. Hughes Aircraft Corp., 912 F.2d 67, 72 (3d Cir.
1990); Ramey v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., 874 F.2d 946, 950 (4th Cir. 1989); Trevino v. General
Dynamics Corp., 865 F.2d 1474, 1480 (5th Cir. 1989).
101. See Tate, 55 F. 3d at 1155-56 (noting that design features of helicopter had been developed
by government and Boeing together over 10-year period); Harduvel v. General Dynamics Corp.,
878 F.2d 1311, 1320 (11th Cir. 1989) (stating that Air Force had solicited proposals from
manufacturers, extensively reviewed winning proposal, and assisted in design of electrical system);
see also Carley v. Wheeled Coach, 991 F.2d 1117, 1125 (3d Cir. 1993); Stout v. Borg-Warner
Corp., 933 F.2d 331,335-36 (5th Cir. 1991); Kleeman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 890 F.2d 698,
702-03 (4th Cir. 1989); Ramey, 874 F.2d at 950; Smith v. Xerox Corp., 866 F.2d 135, 138 (5th Cir.
1989); Trevino, 865 F.2d at 1480-81; Dowd v. Textron, Inc., 792 F.2d 409, 412 (4th Cir. 1986);
McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 450 (9th Cir. 1983); Sundstrom v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 816 F. Supp. 577, 582-83 (N.D. Cal. 1992); In re Aircraft Crash Litig. Frederick,
Md., 752 F. Supp. 1326, 1337 (S.D. Ohio 1990); Galik v. Lockheed Shipbuilding Co., 727 F. Supp.
1433, 1435 (S.D. Ala. 1989).
102. Bailey v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 989 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1993). The precision of
specifications requirement is most clear in cases where the plaintiff has brcught claims based on
both negligence and failure-to-warn. Courts have required the defendant to show that the
government approved not only the specification that caused the injury but the specification
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There has been relatively little litigation over the second prong of the
Boyle test, the requirement that the equipment conform to the contract
specifications. Generally plaintiffs simply have not alleged
nonconformity. 3 When such allegations are made, however, conformity
to specifications may be found explicitly1" or inferred from inspection
and acceptance of the product by the government. 5 Even if the product
does not conform to the original specifications, conformity will be found
when the government has been actively involved in approving
changes."° Finally, a product may conform to specifications even if it
does not perform as intended, so long as it was produced according to
specifications. 7
Under the third prong of the Boyle test, a contractor must warn the
government only of dangers known to it but not to the government. 8 If
the contractor was unaware of the risk (even a risk of which it should
have been aware), if the government actually knew of the risk, if the risk
was common knowledge, or if government knowledge of the risk may be
inferred from the circumstances of the case, the contractor has no duty to
warn.0 9 As with the first and second prongs of the Boyle test, pervasive
involvement by the government gives rise to an inference that it was
aware of the risks."0
regarding any warnings on the product. See Tate, 55 F.3d at 1154; In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos
Cases, 960 F.2d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 1992); In re New York Asbestos Litig., 897 F.2d 626, 632-33
(2d Cir. 1990). But see Smith, 866 F.2d at 136-38 (finding that government approval of design
specifications precludes failure-to-warn claim); Niemann v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 721 F.
Supp. 1019, 1025-27 (S.D. Ill. 1989) (same).
103. See, e.g., Tate, 55 F.3d at 1156.
104. Russek v. Unisys Corp., 921 F. Supp. 1277, 1289-90 (D.N.J. 1996) (mail-sorting machine
constructed according to design specifications).
105. Tate, 55 F.3d at 1156 (inferring conformity where army inspected and approved
helicopter); Carley, 991 F.2d at 1126 (same, where government inspected and accepted
ambulances); Lewis, 985 F.2d at 89 (same, notwithstanding evidence of design defect).
106. Kleemann, 890 F.2d at 702 (finding continuous exchange between government and
contractor to be "persuasive evidence" of conformity).
107. In re Air Disaster at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, 81 F.3d 570, 575 (5th Cir. 1996)
(finding that failure to conform to precatory contractual requirement that airplane be "failsafe" did
not constitute nonconformance when defendant conformed to detailed, quantitative specifications
of contract); see also Harduvel v. General Dynamics Corp., 878 F.2d 1311, 1321 (1 1th Cir. 1989).
108. Boyle v. United States Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988).
109. Smith v. Xerox Corp., 866 F.2d 135, 139 (5th Cir. 1989) (presuming government to be
aware of danger if similar accidents occurred in past); Harduvel, 878 F.2d at 1321-22 (holding that
contractor was required only to warn of actually known dangers); Sundstrom v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 816 F. Supp. 587, 593 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (finding no duty to warn about dangers of
which contractor should have known but did not).
110. Harduvel, 878 F.2d at 1321-22 (knowledge of danger inferred from periodic inspections of
plane); Galik v. Lockheed Shipbuilding Co., 727 F. Supp. 1433, 1436-37 (S.D. Ala. 1989) (finding
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2. A Split Among the Circuits over When the Defense May Be Invoked
Although courts have come close to reaching consensus on how to
apply the elements of the three-part Boyle test, the circuits are split on
the issues of whether the defense may be invoked only by military
contractors and whether the significant conflict requirement is a
threshold test."' These splits reveal a fundamental difference in how the
courts have understood and construed the meaning and scope of Boyle.
a. Applying the Defense to Nonmilitary Contracts
The leading case to apply the government contractor defense in a
nonmilitary setting is Carley v. Wheeled Coach."2 In Carley, an
ambulance manufacturer under contract with the General Services
Administration of the United States invoked the defense after being sued
for negligent design. The Third Circuit allowed the defense, reasoning
that, although Boyle had involved a contract for military equipment, the
underlying rationale of Boyle applies in a nonmilitary setting."' Boyle
sought to protect the discretionary functions of government officials, and
the decisions relating to nonmilitary procurements are no more or less
protected under the FTCA than military procurement decisions."4
Therefore, the defense should be available to any government
contractor."5 Other courts have reached the same conclusion, allowing
the defense even to manufacturers of mail-sorting machines."6
that government was aware of danger when it had designed specifications, hslped design full-scale
models, and conducted numerous inspections).
11I. See Kelly A. Moore, Note, The Third Circuit Expands the Government Contractor Defense
to Include Nonmilitary Contractors, 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 1435 (1994) (reviewing arguments for and
against allowing defense for nonmilitary contractors, and concluding that it should not be available
because doing so would deny numerous plaintiffs any recovery).
112. 991 F.2d 1117 (3d Cir. 1993). In Carley, the plaintiff was an emergency medical
technician. She was injured when the ambulance she was in flipped over waile trying to avoid an
accident. She brought suit against the manufacturer of the ambulance, alleging that it had been
negligently designed because the center of gravity was too high. The district court granted
summary judgment for the defendant based on the government contractor defense. The court of
appeals held that the government contractor defense is available to nonmilitary contractors under
federal common law, but reversed and remanded, finding that the third prong of Boyle had not been
met as a matter of law. Id. at 1127-28.
113. Id. at 1124.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1125.
116. See, e.g., Andrew v. Unisys Corp., 936 F. Supp. 821 (W.D. Okla. 1996); Wisner v. Unisys
Corp., 917 F. Supp. 1501 (D. Kan. 1996).
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Taking a very different approach, the Ninth Circuit, in Nielsen v.
George Diamond Vogel Paint Co."7 and In re Hawaii Federal Asbestos
Cases,"' held that the defense may not be invoked when the product
being manufactured is of a nonmilitary nature, even if the contract is
with a branch of the military.! 9 In Nielsen, the court found that there is a
unique federal interest involved anytime a government official exercises
discretion under the FTCA. '2 The court held, however, that there is only
a "significant conflict" between that interest and state tort law in the
context of military procurement contracts.' Stressing the historical
evolution of the defense,' the court reasoned that even after Boyle, "the
policy behind the defense remains rooted in considerations peculiar to
the military.""n The Second Circuit also has adopted this interpretation
of Boyle.24 For courts taking this approach, of course, the government
contractor defense would not be available to NRC contractors operating
commercial power plants.
b. Applying the "Significant Conflict" Requirement
The courts have adopted two different approaches to analyzing
whether a given case gives rise to a "significant conflict" under Boyle.
This difference, while subtle, has critical implications in the Hanford
case. Under the minority approach, the three-part Boyle test is
considered the means by which a court should determine the existence of
a significant conflict; if the elements are established, then a significant
conflict is deemed to exist. 25
The second approach, followed by the majority of courts, is to treat
the significant conflict analysis as a threshold test. This is the approach
117. 892 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1990).
118. In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 960 F.2d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that
manufacturer of asbestos insulation under contract with Navy could not invoke defense).
119. In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 960 F.2d at 812 (holding that manufacturer of asbestos
insulation under contract with Navy could not invoke defense); Nielsen, 892 F.2d at 1451 (same,
for paint manufacturer under contract with Army).
120. Nielsen, 892 F.2d at 1454.
121. Id. at 1455.
122. See supra Part II.A.
123. Nielsen, 892 F.2d at 1454-55; see also Andrew, 936 F. Supp. at 828-30 (discussing
reasoning of Nielsen).
124. In re Joint E. & S. N.Y. Asbestos Litig., 897 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1990); In re Chateaugay
Corp. 146 B.R. 339, 348-51 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992).
125. See Lewis v. Babcock Indus., Inc., 985 F.2d 83, 89 (2d Cir. 1993); In re Aircraft Crash
Litig. Frederick, Md., 752 F. Supp. 1326, 1337 (S.D. Ohio 1990).
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taken by the courts holding that the defense cannot be applied outside of
contracts for military equipment. 26 Thus in Nielsen, the Ninth Circuit
did not even apply the three-part Boyle test; it determined that because
there was no significant conflict, the case was outside the scope of
Boyle. 2 7 It is also the approach taken by cases that have held that the
federal interest at stake was embodied not in the contract, but in a
federal law or regulation. 2 In Crawford v. National Lead Co.,'29 for
example, the court determined that there was no significant conflict
between the federal anti-pollution laws and the state standard of care;
therefore, it was not necessary to reach the three-part Boyle test. 30
I. THE UNDERLYING RATIONALE OF THE GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTOR DEFENSE DOES NOT APPLY TO PRICE-
ANDERSON CONTRACTORS
There have only been two reported cases in which Price-Anderson
contractors have invoked the government contractor de:Fense: Crawford
v. National Lead Co.13 ' and Lamb v. Martin Marietta Energy Systems,
Inc.132 These cases, along with Hanford, suggest that the government
contractor defense is inappropriate for Price-Anderson contractors. First,
no unique federal interest is threatened. The discretionary decision of a
government official to enter into a contract for the operation of a nuclear
facility constitutes a unique federal interest; however, this interest is not
threatened by the application of state tort law because the contractors are
already adequately protected from liability by the indemnity agreements
and insurance mechanisms of Price-Anderson. Second, even assuming
that a unique federal interest were implicated, it is extremely unlikely
that a "significant conffict" will exist between that federal interest and
the dictates of state tort law. Both federal environmental laws and state
tort laws prohibit the radiation releases upon which lawsuits against
Price-Anderson contractors are likely to be based.
126. See supra notes 119-124 and accompanying text.
127. Nielsen, 892 F.2d at 1450.
128. See Lamb v. Martin Marietta Energy Sys., Inc., 835 F. Supp. 959, 966-67 (W.D. Ky.
1993); Crawford v. National Lead Co. 784 F. Supp. 439, 446-47 (S.D. Ohio 1989). Both of these
cases are similar to Hanford and involve Price-Anderson contractors being sued for injuries caused
by radiation leaks. See infra Part III.A.
129. Crawford, 784 F. Supp. 439.
130. Id. at 447.
131. 784 F. Supp. 439 (S.D. Ohio 1989)
132. 835 F. Supp. 959 (W.D. Ky. 1993).
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A. Background: Government Contractor Defense Cases Under Price-
Anderson
In Crawford v. National Lead Co., the defendants were contractors
who operated a federally-owned uranium metals production plant near
Fernald, Ohio for thirty-four years."' The plaintiffs lived near the plant
and alleged that the defendant's failure to prevent emissions of uranium
and other harmful materials had caused emotional distress and
diminished property values.' The defendants raised the government
contractor defense.'35
The Crawford court held that Boyle's significant conflict requirement
had not been established by the defendants. The defendants conceded
that the operation of the uranium plant caused emissions of uranium and
other harmful materials into the surrounding environment. 3 6 The
defendants also did not dispute the plaintiffs' contention that the
government contractor defense would not apply if the emissions had
violated applicable federal environmental laws.' The court reasoned
that if federal law prohibited the same emissions that were the basis of
the state law claims, there could be no significant conflict.'
"Significant conflict" is defined by reference to the discretionary
function exception to the FTCA, and because there is no discretion to
violate federal law under the FTCA, the government contractor defense
cannot apply when such violations occurred.'39 The court denied cross-
motions for summary judgment, holding that there was a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether federal environmental laws had been
violated. 40 DOE eventually settled the case for seventy-three million
dollars.' 4'
133. Crawford, 784 F. Supp. at 441.
134. Id
135. Id at 441-42.
136. Id at 442.
137. Id at 446. The plaintiffs had alleged that the emissions constituted violations of the Refuse
Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1994), Standards for Protection Against Radiation, 10 C.F.R1 pt. 20
(1988), and the Atomic Energy Commission's ALARA ("as low as reasonably achievable") policy.
Crawford, 784 F. Supp. at 446.
138. Id Note that the court conducted the significant conflict analysis as a threshold test. See
supra Part II.C.2.b and infra note 161 and accompanying text.
139. Crawford, 784 F. Supp. at 446.
140. Id. at 447-48.
141. Ankney, supra note 63, at 416-17 n.] 16. Because the United States must indemnify the
Price-Anderson contractor for any settlement it enters into, the settlement can only be made with
the approval of the United States. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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The facts and holding in Lamb v. Martin Marietta Energy Systems,
Inc. are remarkably similar to Crawford. In Lamb, the plaintiffs owned
property about two miles away from the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion
Plant, which produced nuclear materials for DOE under Price-
Anderson. 42 The Lamb plaintiffs claimed personal injury and property
damage as the result of the defendants' emission of radionuclides into
the groundwater. The defendants moved for summary judgment based in
part on the government contractor defense. 143
Applying the criteria of Boyle, the court found that operating a
nuclear production facility clearly involves a unique federal interest
because the plants are owned and under the exclusive regulation of the
United States.'" However, the court held that there was no significant
conflict with state tort law because "it is not enough to show that a
government official had approved of the plant's activities; the
defendants must show that the government official's approval involved
the permissible exercise of policy judgment."'145 There was no such
showing here, but the court granted summary judgment to the defendants
on other grounds."4
B. No Unique Federal Interest Is Implicated
Although the Lamb and Crawford courts found a unique federal
interest, they failed to recognize that Boyle also requires that the unique
federal interest be implicated.'47 In Boyle, this requirement was met
because of the possibility that the imposition of state tort law would
affect the ability of government officials to procure helicopters with
particular design features at the then-current price. 48 On :he surface, this
rationale would seem to apply equally to contracts to operate nuclear
facilities. If nuclear contractors are subjected to state tort law liability,
either they will be forced to pay damages in the event of a nuclear
accident, or they will purchase liability insurance to cover this
contingency; either way, these costs will be internalized and passed on
to the consumer-that is, the government. At the margin, perhaps,
exposure to this liability could cause some contractors to exit the
142 Lamb v. Martin Marietta Energy Sys., 835 F. Supp. 959, 960 (W.D. Ky. 1993).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 965.
145. Id at 967.
146. Id. at 971-72.
147. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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market. Thus the ability of government officials to enter into contracts
for operation of nuclear facilities at current prices would be affected. 149
The superficial resemblance between this scenario and Boyle becomes
illusory, however, in light of Price-Anderson. DOE contractors like the
Hanford defendants will never bear any of the costs of litigation nor
have to pay any damages if they lose a lawsuit; Price-Anderson
indemnifies them fully. 50 The availability of the government contractor
defense is thus economically meaningless to DOE contractors; either
way, they pay nothing. It follows that allowing state tort lawsuits against
these contractors will have minimal effect on the contract price, the
willingness of private industry to participate, or concomitantly, the
ability of government officials to carry out their discretionary functions.
Because no unique federal interest is at stake, the government contractor
defense should not be available to DOE contractors.
It is possible that DOE contractors who were successfully sued for the
negligent operation of nuclear facilities would be forced to pay higher
insurance premiums, and conceivably these costs would be passed on to
the government. Nevertheless, because DOE contractors must insure
against only about two percent of the potential liability for a nuclear
accident,"' marginal fluctuations in insurance rates should not affect
their willingness to participate in the industry and should have little
effect on the contract price. Moreover, as a matter of public policy,
requiring DOE contractors to carry some liability insurance and to be
responsible for increases in premiums encourages careful conduct.
Allowing the government contractor defense not only would remove this
incentive to operate with care, but it would leave the law in the
nonsensical position of requiring DOE contractors to carry liability
insurance while at the same time immunizing them from liability.'
For NRC contractors, the analysis is slightly more complex, but the
conclusion is most likely the same. Although Price-Anderson caps the
149. This Comment argues that the unique federal interest required to trigger the Boyle defense
is the threat to discretionary government functions under the FTCA. See supra notes 79-86 and
accompanying text. Arguably, if Boyle were to be read more broadly, Price-Anderson's indemnity
payments could constitute a unique federal interest triggering the application of Boyle. However,
because these payments are specifically authorized by Congress, Price-Anderson must preempt any
federal common law defense that would directly eliminate them. See infra Part IV. Therefore, this
argument is not addressed in this subpart.
150. See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
151. DOE contractors are required to carry only up to $200 million of liability insurance for a
potential liability of $8.4 billion. See supra Part I.B.
152. Such contradictions seem to suggest that Congress's statutory prescription should preempt
the government contractor defense for Price-Anderson contractors. See infra Part IV.
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total liability for NRC contractors at $8.4 billion, they and their insurers
ultimately must pay any damages resulting from a nucl.ear accident.153
These contractors would thus benefit from the availability of the
government contractor defense. With the defense, they would pay
nothing so long as the contractor operating the facility where the
accident occurred met the elements of the Boyle test; without the
defense, however, each NRC contractor could be forced to pay up to
$75.5 million any time a serious nuclear accident occurred at an NRC
facility. 54 If these contractors did not have to account for this
contingency, they would not build the expected costs into the terms of
the contracts, and government officials could procure their services at a
reduced rate. But this was not the test of Boyle. Boyle was concerned
only with the possibilities that contractors would increase their prices or
exit the market. 5 To the extent that NRC contractors are forced to
internalize liability costs, they have already done so, and these costs are
already reflected in their contracts with the government. Therefore,
depriving these contractors of the government contractor defense will
have little, if any, effect on their willingness to participate and will not
increase the price of their services. In turn, the unique federal interest of
contracting for the operation of nuclear facilities is not threatened in the
absence of the government contractor defense.
This conclusion for NRC contractors could become less clear,
however, if the underlying cost structure of the industry were to change.
If, for example, scientific advances indicate that a nuclear accident is
more likely or would result in greater damages than originally believed,
the expected costs of retrospective premiums under 'Price-Anderson
might rise closer to the $75.5 million limit. Premiums for primary
liability insurance also might rise. If so, contractors might be less willing
to participate, and the discretionary functions of government officials
might be threatened. Ultimately, however, Boyle does not seem to
require that the government contractor defense be available to account
for such contingencies. The remote, speculative threat to discretionary
government functions hypothesized here seems to be distinguishable
from the direct causal relationship described in Boyle. Regardless, this
argument is inapplicable to DOE contractors like the Hanford
defendants.
153. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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In a broader context, this analysis regarding the implication of a
unique federal interest highlights a potential pitfall for courts in applying
the government contractor defense. Courts have tended to gloss over this
threshold requirement in Boyle, presuming that a unique federal interest
is implicated whenever a government official contracts for goods or
services. As the Price-Anderson ,example illustrates, however,
extraneous laws may work to rebut this presumption. Thus to ensure the
proper application of Boyle, courts must treat the federal interest
requirement as a genuine threshold issue, even though a unique federal
interest may in fact be implicated in the vast majority of government
contracts.
C. There Is No Significant Conflict
The Lamb and Crawford courts were correct in holding that the
government contractor defense under Boyle was intended to protect only
permissible discretionary functions of government officials, and that a
government action that violates federal laws or regulations does not
meet this test. Boyle defined the parameters of the government
contractor defense by reference to the discretionary function exception
to the FTCA. 56 Moreover, in the same year that Boyle was decided, the
Court held in Berkovitz v. United States that the discretionary function
exception does not apply to government actions that violated applicable
federal laws or regulations. 57 Therefore, the government contractor
defense can only protect contractual obligations that do not violate
federal rules. Although this limitation on the government contractor
defense is unavoidable under the law, the results are arguably unfair.
The innocent contractor could argue it should not be forced to pay for
the illegal actions of government officials.
This contention, however, fails in a number of respects. Most
obviously, if there are indemnity agreements, the contractor does not
pay; the government does. Even absent an indemnity agreement, because
the FTCA waives sovereign immunity when the discretionary function
exception does not apply,158 the truly innocent contractor could implead
the government official who approved the illegal action as a third-party
156. Boyle v. United States Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 511 (1988); see also infra notes 89-93
and accompanying text.
157. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531,546-48 (1988) (holding that government officials
who had licensed polio vaccine without conducting tests required by law were not shielded by
discretionary function exception).
158. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1994).
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defendant.'59 Also, it seems likely that a contractor who engaged in
illegal conduct under a contract would have or should have known that
what it was doing was wrong; if so, it should share in the liability. At a
minimum, contractors should not have an incentive to look the other
way when government officials break the law. Finally, plaintiffs do not
have the privilege of knowing the dynamics of the interaction between
the government and the contractor that led to the illegal action;
therefore, they should not bear the burden of guessing who is to blame
when they decide whom to sue.
Notwithstanding the merits of these normative arguments, Boyle and
Berkovitz read together establish that the government contractor defense
does not apply when contracting officials for the government act outside
the bounds of their discretionary authority. In effect, there is an implicit
hierarchy of authority for determining the federal interest to be
examined when courts conduct significant conflict analysis under Boyle.
If a federal statute or regulation exists that governs the permissibility of
the act in question, that rule constitutes the federal interest; only when
there is no such rule will the actions of the government contracting
officer be used to determine whether there is a significant conflict with
state tort law. Implicitly, this was how the Lamb and Crawford courts
analyzed the issue. Because federal law and state law were in accord,
there was no need to look to the terms and conditions of he contracts. If
the contracts allowed for the release of radiation into the environment,
then the government officials had exceeded their discretion; conversely,
if the contracts prohibited the very releases upon which the state tort law
claims were founded, then there was no significant conflict. Either way,
the defense fails. The Hanford defendants are likely to encounter this
conundrum. 160
159. Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
160. Releases at Hanford that occurred after 1972 may violate the Clean Water Act, which
prohibits the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters without a permit. 33 U.S.C. § 131 1(a)
(1994). All releases may be violations of the Refuse Act of 1899, which prohibits the discharge of
refuse into navigable waters. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1994). As early as 1945, Hanford officials knew that
radioactive elements were being released directly into the Columbia River. A formerly classified
statement to Hanford workers, apparently intended to allay fear of radiation exposure, states:
There may be some concern that radioactive water released from the Plant to the Columbia
River will so contaminate the river that its water will be dangerous to man, fish or fowl. It is
true that the water which passes through the units to a act as a coo ant does become
radioactive. But it is also true that the greatest part of this radioactivity is lost before the waste
water is ever put back into the river.
S.T. Cantril, M.D., Assistant Superintendent, Industrial Medicine & H.M. Parker, Chief Supervisor,
Health Treatment Section, The Status of Health and Protection at the Hanj]rd Engineer Works
(Aug. 24, 1945) (on file with Washington Law Review).
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This analysis suggests a resolution to the split among the circuits as to
whether the significant conflict requirement of Boyle should be treated
as a separate, threshold test, or rather should be deemed to exist
whenever the elements of Boyle's three-part test are met. If the
government contractor defense is to be limited to cases where the
government has exercised permissible discretionary functions, the
significant conflict analysis must be done as a threshold test. The three-
part Boyle test takes no account of whether the government had the
authority to approve the specifications in the contract. Thus, if the
significant conflict is not treated as a threshold requirement, a contractor
could escape from liability even when the government-approved action
is an egregious violation of constitutional principles. If, for example, the
contracting official in Crawford6' had ordered the contractor to release
plutonium into the drinking water supply, the contractor would be
completely immune from suit if it could establish the elements of the
three-part Boyle test. This result would protect the impermissible
exercise of government discretion and thus violate the holding of Boyle.
IV. PRICE-ANDERSON PREEMPTS THE GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTOR DEFENSE
Although no court has considered the issue on the record, Price-
Anderson should preempt the government contractor defense. In a broad
range of legal areas, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that federal
common law doctrines may exist only when Congress has not acted in a
given area or when the dictates of common law are parallel and
complementary to the statutory scheme prescribed by Congress. Because
neither condition is present here, Price-Anderson must preempt the
government contractor defense.
A. Background: Statutory Preemption ofFederal Common Law
The preliminary determination of whether an act of Congress
preempts federal common law turns on the question of whether the
statutory scheme is sufficient to address the problem that the common
law rule is designed to address. In Milwaukee v. Illinois,62 the U.S.
Supreme Court held that Congress's passage of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 ("Clean Water Act")
161. See supra notes 133-141.
162. 451 U.S. 304, 315 n.8 (1981).
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preempted the federal common law of nuisance. 6 ' The Court noted that
a federal statute need not proclaim itself as providing the exclusive
fights or remedies, or prohibiting the application of federad common law.
Rather, preemption occurs whenever Congress has "[spoken] directly to
a question."'" Because the Clean Water Act is a comprehensive
regulatory program supervised by an expert administrative agency
established by Congress, the judicially-created law of interstate nuisance
was preempted.
65
Similarly, in Brown v. General Services Administration,'66 the Court
held that the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, was "the exclusive
judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment,"
and thus would preempt earlier federal common law remedies.167 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that Congress had established a
very detailed, specific procedure for how claims of discrimination were
to be made. All administrative remedies had to be exhausted before a
claim could be made in court, and the claim had to be made within thirty
days.168 Noting that Congress had established "a careful blend of
administrative and judicial enforcement powers," the Court stated that
"[i]t would require the suspension of disbelief to ascribe lo Congress the
design to allow its careful and thorough remedial scheme to be
circumvented by artful pleading.' '169
This does not mean, however, that any time a federal statute exists to
address a problem or area there is no room for federal common law. In
Carlson v. Green,7 ' the U.S. Supreme Court held that the availability of
a statutory remedy under the FTCA did not deny the plaintiff the right to
assert a federal common law claim for Fourth Amendment violations
under color of authority.'7 ' The Court stated that Congress had made it
"crystal clear" that the FTCA and the federal common law should
provide "parallel, complementary causes of action."'7  The Court also
163. Id. at 317-19.
164. Id. at 315 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978)).
165. Id. at 317 ("Congress has not left the formulation of appropriate federal standards to the
courts... but rather has occupied the field through the establishment of a comprehensive
regulatory program supervised by an expert administrative agency.").
166. 425 U.S. 820 (1976).
167. Id. at 835.
168. Idl at 831-33.
169. Idl at 833.
170. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
171. The Court previously had established an implied cause of action for sach violations under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
172. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 19-20.
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noted that the federal common law claim is a more effective remedy
than the FTCA in a number of instances, implying that it addresses
problems that have not been addressed by Congress. 73 The Court thus
held that the appropriate test for determining whether a federal statute
preempts federal common law is "whether Congress has created what it
views as an equally effective remedial scheme."' 74
Considered together, these cases establish a two-part test: (1)
Preemption will occur whenever Congress has acted on the same issue
or area addressed by the federal common law unless (2) Congress
intended for the statutory and common law schemes to be parallel and
complementary.
B. Price-Anderson Preempts the Government Contractor Defense
The application of the government contractor defense to Price-
Anderson contractors would directly undermine Congressional intent.
Price-Anderson carefully balances the competing goals of encouraging
private contractors to enter the nuclear industry and providing adequate
compensation to victims in the event of a nuclear accident.' Allowing
the contractor immunity defense here, especially if the defense were
construed broadly, would completely frustrate the second of these two
goals. Price-Anderson thus should preclude the application of the
government contractor defense because Price-Anderson has left no room
for the common law to exist, and because the two doctrines are not
parallel and complementary.
1. The Government Contractor Defense Covers the Same Ground as
Price-Anderson
Price-Anderson and the government contractor defense were created
for the same purpose: to ensure that the government would be able to
contract with private industry for goods or services that the government
deemed important. Moreover, the two schemes seek to achieve this goal
by employing the same methodology of immunizing government
contractors from lawsuits. In essence, the two regimes differ only as to
the scope of application, the method of immunization, and the level of
legislative detail. Price-Anderson is relatively narrow in scope, focusing
173. IdR at 22-23.
174. Id. at 22 n.10.
175. See supra Part I.A.
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only on the nuclear industry; it immunizes contractors with indemnity
agreements; and it was established through a complex, detailed statutory
scheme. Conversely, the government contractor defense is broad in
scope, applying at least to all government contracts for military goods or
services and perhaps to all government contracts, depending on the
circuit; it immunizes contractors by providing an affirmative defense;
and it was created by a short and arguably ambiguous judicial decision.
Ultimately, however, the two regimes are addressed to the same
concern; therefore, the government contractor defense should be
preempted unless it is parallel and complementary to the system
established under Price-Anderson.
2. Price-Anderson and the Government Contractor Defense Are Not
Parallel and Complementary
A comparison of the Boyle defense and the Price-Anderson indemnity
scheme reveals that, unlike in Carlson, the common law and statutory
provisions are not parallel and complementary. Indeed, the government
contractor defense would directly undermine Price-Anderson's purpose
of providing adequate compensation to victims of nuclear accidents. At
the time Price-Anderson was enacted, little was understood about the
potential dangers of atomic energy. Congress worried that even if
everything was done correctly, an accident might occur and people
might be harmed. 76 Therefore, it set up a compensation and
indemnification scheme that was, essentially, a no-fault system. If
plaintiffs could establish a tort under state law, they could recover from
the contractor.177 And if the contractor had to pay damages, then
regardless of fault, it would be indemnified.' Moreover, Congress did
not create a specific cause of action to provide relief to plaintiffs. Instead
it relied on state tort law to effect its objective of providing adequate
compensation to victims of nuclear accidents.' Allowing the
government contractor defense could effectively eviscerate the ability of
state tort law to compensate victims of nuclear incidents. As long as the
contractor could establish the elements of the Boyle test, the victims
would get nothing.
176. See supra Part I.A.
177. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
178. See supra Part I.B.
179. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
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Allowing Price-Anderson contractors to invoke the government
contractor defense thus would create an artificial and arbitrary split
among Price-Anderson plaintiffs. Plaintiffs could recover for their
injuries if the elements of the Boyle test were not met, and they could
not recover for the injuries if the Boyle test was met. In passing and
amending Price-Anderson, Congress intended to make no such arbitrary
distinction. Price-Anderson must be seen as precluding the availability
of the government contractor defense to Price-Anderson contractors.
V. CONCLUSION
Price-Anderson contractors should be precluded from invoking the
government contractor defense. The underlying reasons for the existence
of the government contractor defense lose their logical force in this
arena. The U.S. Supreme Court created the defense because it was
concerned that if contractors were exposed to liability even when fully
complying with the terms of a government contract, either they would be
frightened into exiting the market, or they would internalize the liability
costs and increase their prices. But the economics of the nuclear industry
do not work like this. Price-Anderson contractors are either fullyimmunized from liability under indemnity agreements with the
government, or they are already protected with private insurance and by
Price-Anderson's risk-spreading mechanisms. Regardless, not allowing
them to invoke the government contractor defense will have minimal
effect on the price of nuclear contracts or the willingness of industry to
participate. Furthermore, the defense is unlikely to work because of the
difficulty of meeting the "significant conflict" requirement. There can be
no significant conflict when state tort law claims are based on releases of
radiation that are also prohibited by federal law.
More fundamentally, federal common law cannot fill a gap that does
not exist. The Price-Anderson Act is a complex and comprehensive
piece of legislation that is carefully constructed to balance competing
policy interests. It seeks to develop and promote nuclear power by
encouraging private industry to participate; at the same time,
recognizing the inherent risk of the enterprise, it seeks to ensure that any
victims of nuclear accidents will be adequately compensated. The
government contractor defense would upset this balance. It would
duplicate the protections Price-Anderson already provides to nuclear
contractors, providing a superfluous affirmative defense on top of Price-
Anderson's already generous indemnity agreements. Moreover, allowing
the defense would subvert Congress's goal of ensuring the compensation
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of victims. As long as contractors followed orders and played by the
rules, victims would get nothing. These duplicative and subversive
results contravene congressional intent and require that Price-Anderson
preempt the government contractor defense.
The Hanford case is of interest in part because it raises these issues,
but more importantly because it clearly illuminates the injustice of
allowing a government contractor defense in this area. The Hanford
plaintiffs' allegations paint a bleak picture of the last fi.fty years. The
plaintiffs claim that the government and its contractors negligently and
intentionally released large amounts of radiation onto a rural population;
that despite knowledge of the danger, no one was warned; and that as a
result, thousands of people are seriously ill or dead. Even assuming all
of these allegations to be true, the government contractor defense could
prevent the victims from receiving any compensation. TIhis, of course,
makes no difference to the contractors, who, with or without the defense,
will pay nothing because of their indemnity agreements with the
government. Instead, it simply means that the U.S. Government will not
have to make indemnity payments. Although protecting the public fisc
and reducing the national deficit are laudable public policy objectives,
they pale in juxtaposition with the inequity of denying nuclear victims
any legal recourse. The Hanford contractors eventually may prevail on
one of the scores of defenses they have asserted, but they should not
have access to the government contractor defense.
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